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Abstract 
This article examines Wagner’s Law for East Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) for the period 1960 to 2007. Using the Gregory and 
Hansen (1996a & b) structural break techniques, we find a cointegrating relationship 
between real government spending and real income. Our preferred Gregory and 
Hansen models are with the level shift for Hong Kong and Taiwan and regime shift 
(change in intercept and slope coefficients) for China, Japan and South Korea. The 
income elasticity of government spending ranges from 0.756 to 1.155. With these 
findings, we infer that Wagner’s Law does hold for these countries, except for Hong 
Kong where the income elasticity is not highly statistically significant.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The link between public spending and economic growth has been examined vastly in the 
empirical literature. In the original study, Wagner (1883) formulated his famous law in which 
he argued, on the basis of several developed countries, that there is a positive long run 
relationship between public spending and national income. The public spending in Wagner’s 
Law is treated as an endogenous factor, that is, in the long run causality runs from national 
income to government spending. The basic Wagnerian assumption is that public spending 
increases at a faster rate than the growth of national income. From this perspective, Wagner 
quote this as “the law of increasing expansion of public, and particularly state, activities’ 
becomes for the fiscal economy the law of the increasing expansion of fiscal requirements...” 
(Gemmell 1993, pp.104 and Muhlis and Hakan 2003, pp.58). Alternatively, Keynes (1936) 
postulates that fiscal policies boosts economic growth during a recession. In other words, 
causality runs from government spending to national income. 
 
The relationship between government spending and national income is important for 
policy issues over the short to medium term. First, the current unprecedented worldwide 
recession has strained many central authorities to amplify spending on required sectors. In 
this case, the empirical results based on Wagner’s Law permits the respective governments to 
formulate a benchmark against which to evaluate the stance of expenditure policy and by and 
large fiscal policy.1 Second, this relation is relevant for the debate on the sustainability of 
public finances, especially during the phase when governments struggle to restrain the 
unwarranted spending. Therefore, this relation provides a framework to formulate appropriate 
budgetary adjustment plans with an outlook to attaining medium term budgetary objectives 
and/or reducing prolonged deficits. Because of these important policy implications, the 
validity of Wagner’s Law should be tested within an adequate methodological framework. 
One of the problems identified by Abizadeh and Gray (1985) and Ram (1987) is the 
availability of public finance data. This law, in spite of a number of empirical investigations 
with alternative specifications and estimation techniques, still remains popular. Recent key 
empirical studies on Wagner’s Law have been critically surveyed by Peacock and Scott 
(2000). They conclude that majority of these studies contain misspecification bias and 
intensively use sophisticated estimation techniques that over-elaborate the results.  
 
In light of the above observations it would be imprudent to argue that our present 
paper is the final in examining the Wagner’s Law. The main purpose of this paper is to show 
how the Wagner’s Law can be analysed with a technique that allows for structural breaks in 
the cointegrating relationship. We examine the Wagner’s Law for East Asian countries 
(China, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) with the well-known Gregory and 
Hansen (1996a & b) techniques for the period 1960-2007. The balance of this paper is 
organized as follows: Section 2 briefly provides an overview of the literature. Section 3 
discusses the specification and methodology. Section 4 details empirical results and Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Brief Overview of the Literature  
 
Wagner’s Law has been tested empirically for various countries using cross-section, time 
series and panel data methods, and results vary considerably from country to country with 
                                                          
1 Arpaia and Turrini (2008) explicitly outlines the importance and application of Wagner’s law in the context of 
EU countries. 
some supportive and some opposing  evidence. The main findings of a few selected studies 
are summarized in Table-1. Essentially these studies estimate one or more of the following 
equations.  
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where G =  real total government spending, Y =  real GDP, PCY =  real GDP per capita, 
PCE =  real total government spending per capita, GY =  ratio of real total government 
spending to real GDP, andi t are country and time subscripts and (0, ) it Nε σ for all 
andi t . 
{Table 1 about here} 
 
As presented in Table 1, studies such as Cotsomitis et al. (1996), Ahsan et al. (1996), 
Abizadeh and Yousefi (1998), Kolluri et al. (2000), Islam (2001), Chang et al. (2004) and 
Sideris (2007) produced evidence in favor of Wagner’s Law.2 Alternatively, studies such as 
Courakis et al. (1993), Ansari et al. (1997), Chow et al. (2002), Burney (2002), Muhlis and 
Hakan (2003), Huang (2006), Sinha (2007) and Narayan et al. (2007) find little support for 
Wagner’s Law. For a comprehensive literature survey, see Peacock and Scott (2000). Most 
importantly, none of these studies has examined the possibility of a structural break in the 
long run cointegrating relationship. Therefore, in what follows, we start with a clean slate and 
examine the Wagner’s Law in East Asian countries with the recently developed Gregory and 
Hansen (1996a & b) structural break techniques.  
 
3. Specification and Methodology 
3.1. Model Selection  
 
The central issue in testing Wagner’s Law is the choice of appropriate model specification. 
Initially, we tested equations (1) to (5) for cointegration using Gregory and Hansen 
techniques. We find meaningful results with only (1).3 Therefore we will use equation (1) to 
examine the validity of Wagner’s Law in East Asian countries. A similar specification was 
also used by Peacock and Wiseman (1961), Bird (1971), Gandhi (1971), Ram (1992), 
Courakis et al. (1993) and Oxley (1994).  If Wagner’s Law holds, the coefficient on real 
income will be significant and positive.  We use annual time series data for the period 1960-
2007 and these can be sourced from the International Financial Statistics CD-ROM (IFS, 
2008) and World Development Indicators (WDI, 2008). 
 
3.2 Cointegration with Structural Breaks 
 
Gregory and Hansen (1996a & b) has developed a unique structural break test which 
accommodates a single endogenous break in an underlying cointegrating relationship. This 
technique is an extension of Zivot and Andrews (1992). Gregory and Hansen (GH 
                                                          
2 Chang et al. (2004) and Abizadeh and Yousefi (1998) has produced some mixed results.  
3 The null hypothesis of no cointegration was not rejected in equations (2) to (5). These results are not reported 
to conserve space. 
henceforth) has proposed the following four models with alternative assumptions about 
structural breaks.  
 
Model-I: Level shift 
ln Gt = µ1 + µ2 δtp + α1 lnYt  + εt                                                                                         (6) 
 
Model-II: Level shift with trend 
ln Gt = µ1 + µ2 δtp + β1t + α1 lnYt + εt                                                                                  (7) 
 
Model-III: Regime shift where intercept and slope coefficients change 
 lnGt = µ1 + µ2 δtp + β1t + α1 lnYt + α11 lnYt δtp + εt                                                             (8) 
 
Model-IV: Regime shift where intercept, slope coefficients and trend change  
lnGt = µ1 + µ2 δtp + β1t + β2tδtp + α1 lnYt + α11 lnYt δtp + εt                                                  (9) 
 
where t  is time subscript, p is the break date, δ is a dummy variable and ε  is an error term, 
such that:   
 
δtp = 0   if   t < p   and   δtp = 1   if   t > p                                                                               (10)        
 
The GH tests the null hypothesis of no cointegration with structural breaks against the 
alternative of cointegration.  The break date is found by estimating the cointegration 
equations for all possible break dates in the sample. We select a break date where the test 
statistic is the minimum or in other words the absolute ADF test statistic is at its maximum.  
GH have tabulated the critical values by modifying the MacKinnon (1991) procedure for 
testing cointegration in the Engle-Granger method for unknown breaks.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Unit root tests 
 
We first test for stationarity properties of the variables. Specifically, we use the Augmented 
Dicky Fuller (ADF) and Phillips Perron (PP) tests and the results are reported in Table-2.  
The ADF tests have been applied for both levels and their first differences with an intercept 
and trend. The ADF and PP statistics for the level variables (government spending and 
income) do not exceed the critical values (in absolute terms). However, when we take the 
first difference of each of the variables, the ADF and PP statistics are higher than the 
respective critical values (in absolute terms). Therefore, in all cases the level variables are 
I(1) and their first differences are stationary. 
{Table 2 about here} 
 
 
4.2 Gregory and Hansen Tests 
In what follows, we report our GH results. The four models in Equations (6) to (9) are 
estimated from 1960-2007 and the results are presented in Table-3.  
{Table 3 about here} 
 
The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected for China because the GH test 
statistic (absolute) is higher than 5 percent critical value (absolute) in models 2 and 3. For 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, Model I rejects the null hypothesis while in case of Japan and South 
Korea its model III.  These results imply that there exists a long run relationship between real 
government spending and real GDP in the East Asian countries. The endogenously 
determined break date is 1997 or 1998 in these models.4  The break date in the sample at 
1997/98 is plausible because this period highlights the Asian financial crises. The financial 
crises gripped much of East Asia during 1997/98 and raised fears of a worldwide economic 
meltdown due to financial contagion.5  
 
Next we have used Engle Granger technique to estimate the cointegrating equations 
for the models in which cointegration exists. These results are reported in Table-4. We 
disregard the estimates of model II for China because the income elasticity is insignificant 
with unexpected negative sign. However, our results with model III for China are plausible 
and therefore we select this as the optimal model. For Hong Kong the income elasticity is 
significant only at 10 percent level. For other three countries, viz. Japan, Taiwan and South 
Korea, all the estimated coefficients are significant at 5 percent level. The income elasticity 
of government spending ranges from 0.756 to 1.155. This imply that a 1 percent increase in 
income leads to around 0.756 to 1.155 percent increase in government spending in these 
countries. With these findings, we infer that Wagner’s Law does hold for the East Asian 
economies, albeit weak evidence in Hong Kong.  
 
{Table 4 about here} 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this article, we examined the Wagner’s Law for East Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) using Gregory and Hansen (1996a & b) structural break 
techniques for the period 1960 to 2007. Our preferred Gregory and Hansen models are the 
level shift for Hong Kong and Taiwan and regime shift where intercept and slope coefficients 
change for China, Japan and South Korea. The break date in these models is either 1997 or 
1998 and this is plausible because this period draws attention to the East Asian financial 
turmoil. The income elasticity of government spending is significant at 5 percent level for all 
these countries, except Hong Kong at 10 percent level.  The income elasticity ranges from 
0.756 to 1.155 implying that a 1 percent increase in income leads to around 0.756 to 1.155 
percent increase in government spending. Thus, we conclude that Wagner’s Law does hold 
for these East Asian countries, except for Hong Kong where the income elasticity is not 
highly statistically significant.   
 
Our study does have limitations. First, we used a simple specification of Wagner’s 
Law and ignored to add other variables such as money supply, relative prices and socio-
                                                          
4 We ignore the break dates of the models where no cointegration exists. 
5 The East Asian countries suffered mainly from the loss of demand and confidence, slumping currencies and 
devalued stock markets and other asset prices, see McKibbin and Martin (1998).  
political factors. Second, we did not use disaggregated data that may provide some useful 
policy insights. We hope that our work is useful for further work on this topic.  
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Table-1: Empirical Studies Related to Wagner’s Law 
Author Country Period Specification/ 
Methodology 
Main Findings 
Courakis et al. 
(1993) 
 
Greece  
Portugal 
1958-1985 (1)/ 
ML 
Equation (1) was extended to incorporate 
permanent income, relative prices, 
stabilization policy and socio-political 
factors. However, there is little evidence of 
Wagner’s law in both countries. 
Ahsan et al. 
(1996) 
Canada 1952-1988 (1) and (4)/ 
EG 
Support for Wagner’s Law in Canada. 
Cotsomitis et al. 
(1996) 
China 1952-1992 (1) to (5)/ 
EG 
Support for Wagner’s Law in China. 
Ansari  et al. 
(1997) 
 
Ghana 
Kenya 
South 
Africa 
1963-1988 
1964-1989 
1957-1990 
(1)/ 
EG 
No support for Wagner’s Law in all cases.  
Abizadeh and 
Yousefi (1998) 
South 
Korea 
1961-1992 (1)/ 
ML 
Private sector income Granger-cause 
expenditure growth. 
Government spending have not contributed 
to economic growth. 
Kolluri et al. 
(2000) 
G7 
countries 
1960-1993 (1)/ 
ECM 
Support for Wagner’s Law in G7 countries 
Islam (2001) USA 1929-1996 (4)/ 
JML 
Support for Wagner’s Law in USA 
Burney (2002) 
 
Kuwait 1969-1995 (4)/ 
JML 
Equation (4) was extended to include other 
socioeconomic variables. In all cases, there 
is no support for Wagner’s Law in Kuwait. 
Chow et al. 
(2002) 
UK 1948-1997 (1) and (4)/ 
JML 
No Support for Wagner’s Law. However, the 
inclusion of money supply re-establishes the 
long run link between government spending 
and income  in UK. 
Muhlis and 
Hakan (2003) 
Turkey 1965-2000 (1) to (5)/ 
EG 
No support for Wagner’s Law in Turkey. 
Chang et al. 
(2004) 
10 
Countries 
1951-1996 (1) to (5)/ 
JML 
Support for Wagner’s Law in South Korea, 
Taiwan, Japan, UK and US.  
No support for Wagner’s Law in Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and 
Thailand. 
Huang (2006) China 
Taiwan 
1979-2002 (1) to (5)/ 
ARDL 
No support for Wagner’s Law in China and 
Taiwan. 
Sinha (2007) Thailand 1950-2003 (1) to (5)/ 
ARDL 
No Support for Wagner’s Law in Thailand. 
Narayan et al. 
(2007) 
Chinese 
Provinces 
1952-2004 (1) to (3)/ 
Pedroni 
Less support for Wagner’s Law for China. 
Sideris (2007) 
 
Greece 1833-1938 (1) to (5)/ 
JML 
Support for Wagner’s Law in Greece. 
JML is Johansen maximum likelihood, EG is Engle and Granger, ARDL is autoregressive distributed lag model, 
ML is autoregressive maximum likelihood and ECM error correction method. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Results of ADF and PP Unit Root Tests 
Variables lnG ∆lnG lnY ∆lnY 
China 
ADF Statistic 
PP Statistic 
 
0.166 [1] 
0.443 [5] 
 
6.523 [0] 
3.992 [2] 
 
1.702 [0] 
1.876 [2] 
 
10.581 [0] 
5.760 [4] 
Hong Kong 
ADF Statistic 
PP Statistic 
 
1.334 [0] 
1.779 [2] 
 
3.668 [0] 
5.671 [3] 
 
2.834 [1] 
1.221 [3] 
 
5.552 [1] 
4.902 [2] 
Japan 
ADF Statistic 
PP Statistic 
 
0.056 [0] 
0.557 [4] 
 
4.671 [1] 
8.730 [3] 
 
0.114 [1] 
0.905 [2] 
 
4.447 [1] 
8.100 [2] 
Taiwan 
ADF Statistic 
PP Statistic 
 
2.356 [0] 
0.388 [2] 
 
3.701 [0] 
4.112 [5] 
 
1.523 [1] 
2.030 [2] 
 
7.922 [0] 
10.860 [1] 
South Korea 
ADF Statistic 
PP Statistic 
 
0.117 [1] 
0.468 [3] 
 
7.369 [0] 
4.550 [2] 
 
0.892 [0] 
1.169 [2] 
 
5.366 [1] 
12.802 [2] 
Notes: The ADF and PP critical values at 5%, respectively, are 3.521 and 3.519. The lag lengths for ADF  
and PP are in parenthesis.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table-3: Cointegration Tests with Structural Breaks 1960-2007 
 Break Date GH Test 
Statistic 
5%  Critical 
Value 
Existence of 
Cointegration 
China 
Model-I 
Model-II 
Model-III 
Model-IV 
 
1984 
1997 
1998 
1987 
 
-1.007 
-5.822 
-6.501 
-1.427 
 
-3.603 
-3.603 
-3.190 
-3.190 
 
No 
YES 
YES 
No 
Hong Kong 
Model-I 
Model-II 
Model-III 
Model-IV 
 
1998 
2001 
1985 
1997 
 
-3.844 
-0.176 
-1.223 
-1.427 
 
-3.603 
-3.603 
-3.190 
-3.190 
 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Japan 
Model-I 
Model-II 
Model-III 
Model-IV 
 
1992 
1997 
1998 
1998 
 
-2.550 
-1.998 
-5.626 
-0.489 
 
-3.603 
-3.603 
-3.190 
-3.190 
 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Taiwan 
Model-I 
Model-II 
Model-III 
Model-IV 
 
1997 
1997 
2002 
1986 
 
-6.003 
-0.006 
-1.532 
-0.021 
 
-3.603 
-3.603 
-3.190 
-3.190 
 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
South Korea 
Model-I 
Model-II 
Model-III 
Model-IV 
 
1997 
2002 
1997 
1986 
 
-2.901 
-0.115 
-3.650 
-1.263 
 
-3.603 
-3.603 
-3.190 
-3.190 
 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
Table-4: Cointegrating Equations 1960-2007 
 China 
Model-II  Model-III 
Hong- 
Kong 
Model-I 
Japan 
 
Model-III 
 
Taiwan 
 
Model-I 
South 
Korea 
Model-III 
Intercept 1.376 
(3.87)a 
1.376 
(3.87) a 
0.734 
(2.11) a 
0.774 
(2.11) a 
1.602 
(3.35) a 
0.935 
(2.15) a 
Dum Intercept 
 
0.628 
(5.00) a 
0.628 
(5.00) a 
-1.568 
(2.02) a 
1.944 
(3.27) a 
-0.056 
(2.08) a 
5.621 
(1.85) b 
Trend 
 
6.772 
(1.88) b 
      
ln Yt -3.562 
(0.72) 
0.905 
(4.52) a 
1.003 
(1.89)b 
0.756 
(5.58) a 
0.899 
(4.46) a 
1.155 
(2.17) a 
Dum  ln Yt  1.102 
(2.11) a 
 0.987 
(4.75) a 
 1.266 
(2.50) a 
Notes: Absolute t-ratios are in parentheses below the coefficients.  Significance at 5% and 10%  
levels are denoted by a and b respectively.  
 
